The Trickiness of Values

I chose to represent privacy as a continuous variable over a specific range.  

While my diagrams (last post) presents the overall schema, my model stays within an even narrower range here, [+1,+9] by focusing on the positive valuation of privacy as a human value.  In a formal model it is demonstrable that small differences yield significant outcomes (more or less privacy overall, for example).  The notion that the value of privacy is somewhat inflexible or more important in context is consistent with this level of sensitivity.   

Different individuals may perceive their subjective assessment of their privacy differently, for example, a value of 5 to me might be high privacy, while to another data subject it might very low privacy.  To that extent, my model disregards the need for stratification at the outset, suggesting that this may be a topic for future work. 

Once testable, the formal model may allow observation of anomalies or consistencies in the behaviour of privacy that have not been observable prior because they were untestable (and therefore not subject to Popper’s refutability principle).  It becomes possible to identify privacy behavioural norms.  To that end, experiments have been designed to test the model with data subjects to observe behaviour and present those results (later).

This ‘implementation’ of sorts is a first step towards the possibilities presented by using values for formal models in privacy.